After the Chernobyl's and Three Miles's accidents, the relation between technology and risk started to be questioned. Social scientist posited considerable criticism against technology and how its interventions may engender new dangers. However, these views ignored the fact that risks are not just a result of technology, but also depend upon the trust and knowledge. Any risk, first, should be defined as a narrative which is enrooted in a previous cultural and stereotyped framework. By itself, technology is only an instrument employed in different directions. This essay review explores the limitations and approaches of two senior sociologists who delved in the study of risk and climate change, Cass Sunstein and Anthony Giddens.
Introduction
From Chernobyl onwards academicians leveled considerable criticism on the role of technology as it impacts and benefits human life. In what was one of the best-selling books on the sociology of risk, Ulrich Beck realized that accidents under some conditions were the result of an inadequate manipulation of technology. If modern society had been based on Fordist scale production, Chernobyl marked the turning-point of a new era where risk predominated. With this backdrop, Beck considers that post-modernity needs technology and risk in order for the capital to be replicated (Beck, 2006) . Although, technological advances, in forms of computers, ITC, and devices, are aimed at making of this world a safer site to be, mitigating and controlling the risk, the fact is that somehow, it contributes to creating new risks, which go beyond the control of society. This pungent point of view was widely examined by sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists in the recent decades. Is technology and technological advance a threat or a benefit for humankind? Ecological concerns are perhaps a point where more vividly may be seen the paradox of technology appreciated.
The goal of this chapter aims at exploring the connection between technology and risk. In doing so, the discussion between Sunstein and Giddens should be situated under the lens of scrutiny. While the former argues that fears are determined by cognitive shortcuts, the latter considers that risk seems to be a result of technology. Giddens is a detractor of confidence in technology, although he praises its benefits. Sunstein is convinced that risk is a product of human ignorance and inaccuracy in the decision making process. Two views, two alternatives are juxtaposed in a debate that has not been finished to date.
The Sunstein-Giddens debate draws the boundaries of policy analysis within a world capitalist framework. That is, their debate stays safely within the ethos and assumptions of the currently prevailing political economic system that dominates the globe. Sunstein is a legal scholar and professor in the Law School the University of Chicago, He is part of the clique there that adheres to the so-called law and economics framework derived from the Chicago School of Economics. This Chicago School has been led by such world luminaries as Gary Becker, Milton Friedman, and others whose ideas owe much to the Austrian school of Frederick Hayek. They are anti-Marxist, anti-Keynesian, and avowedly neoclassical. In practice their ideas formed the basis for the neoliberalism of Western hegemony in the late twentieth century. A hallmark of their thought and its legal and public policy applications is the central figure of the rational actor. The rational actor is a heuristic to allow various econometric formulae to have some reference to the real world. The rational actor is the homo economicus who always acts to ensure the greatest economic advantage to him or herself as an individual. All theories flow from this assumption which is markedly individualistic and assumes a kind of cognitive functioning rarely if ever found among real people.
Anthony Giddens takes a social analytic approach that is neither individualistic nor based on the assumption of blind social forces and structures that operate without human agency. Giddens' approach combines individual agency with social structure. He does not assume a rational actor, but sees a dialectic between the effects of sociation (social structures, institutions, and the like) and the ways people act. Most relevant to the Sunstein-Giddens debate and the present essay is that Giddens that technology is both a consequence and cause of human behavior as they shape each other. Their debate comes down to one between the neoliberals and the Keynesian. It ignores the far more far reaching and radical critiques offered by a number of authors reviewed in this article.
Preliminary Debate
In what follows a number of analysts are reviewed. None is directly involved in the Sunstein-Giddens debate. Nonetheless, each analyst presents a different aspect of technological evolution, its consequences, and its relationship to human behavior and decision making. Technology plays a pivotal role in organizing not only behavior but also the society itself. Undoubtedly, the technical advances blurred the connection between time and space, facilitating many things for people. Among the benefits of technology applied to health for example, we have, -Lights and electricity created a real revolution in the way of displacements.
-The life expectancy has been expanded. -The techniques of education have been radically altered providing new resources.
-Risk, disasters and other dangers may be mitigated by means of technology.
G. Amar (2011) argues that the evolution of technology has made life safer in many senses. The current meaning of mobility seems to be something else than a technique. This exhibits a spirit a kind of social bond that connects self with territory. Technology may be not only positive, but allows re-discovering the principle of "religance." This neologism refers to the anthropological sense of place. The principle of religance that circumscribes the subject to the community may create new technologies, more sustainable for ecology that improves our quality of life. From this perspective, Amar argues that innovation would play a pivotal role in the industry of mobility worldwide. In contrast to the existent French literature, Amar is strongly convinced that there are two ways of moving. If we evaluate the problem of mobility in terms of space-time criterion, we need to conclude that technology has made life faster, but not safer. Rather, Amar adds, there is surfacing a new manner of transport, where people are experiencing the "time-substance" to fabricate sentiment respecting visited spaces. This new type of mobility follows recreational goals determining long-standing and satisfactory experiences (Amar, 2011) .
Even technology serves as a mechanism of mitigating, forecasting and preventing disasters. In opposition to this, P. Virilio considers that technology acquires a negative tendency because it expands not only the process of alienation but blurs the boundaries of heritage and nationhood (Virilio, 1996) . On the arts of Motor, Virilio says that mass media is framing and controlling the sense of reality. Today it is in vain to question the veracity of news, what is important for audience is the hyper-reality. Human perception has been captivated to see only events that never have happened; rather, they are enrooted in the future. Showing a natural tendency to communicate with others, human beings adapt their behavior to specific environs. Events geographically dispersed, are broadcast on the same screen synchronized in seconds. The acceleration of mobility triggered an inevitable confusion between present and future. As a result of this, technology leads to a decline of trust and social bonds. Unlike Amar, Virilio thinks the technology eliminates the natural barriers that prevent risks. During the XXth century, cities were built as refuges that marked the ends and beginnings of civilization. Any event, whatever its nature may be, is controlled by the wall. In the digital world where all cities are cloned and globalized, any event may trigger a real disaster (Virilio, 2007; Virilio, 2010) .
In his study of the new social self, One Dimensional Man, first published 1964, H. Marcuse argued that technological societies are irretrievably flawed. At the same time that technology advances, liberty is being sacrificed. The dependency of human beings on the newest technique not only paves the ways for the advent of a new ideology, but also depersonalizes the workers in favor of capital (Marcuse, 1991 Huxley introduces readers to a discussion where society is defined as a set of embodiments based on abstract ideas. This novel represents an acid criticism to techno-world and overpopulation. Given the demographic decontrol in urban areas, Huxley envisaged that technology would be efficient in controlling human beings as machines. As a result of this, democracies would be converted to governments bound to totalitarianism (Huxley, 2006) .
Last but not least, D. Barney presents a galvanized model to understand the role of technology and its effects on democracy and political life. He says that although technology leads humankind beyond the ethical question, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that it should be defined as a political construction, whose ends are based on imposing a specific discussion (Barney, 2007) . The problem of technology is that any question is answered before being formulated. Proponents of technology have criticized this view by saying it transcends the boundaries of culture and ethnocentrism. Technology in a globalized world permits changes and different postures directly to a species of Trans-humanism. This would entail a more democratic and fairer society (Hughes, 2004) . In this vein, the British journalist Guy Sorman polemically admits that risk detractors are more interested in preserving the status quo than in exploring the benefits of development. Technology for Sorman not only is good and positive, but also emancipatory from many points of view. Enemies of technology are reluctant to the progress. In lieu of accepting this, they prefer to confuse public opinion by inventing risks that do not exist (Sorman, 2002) .
Generally, academicians have agreed that given some circumstances, technology may engender some risks, which if not duly evaluated, lead to future states of emergency. Of this point, likely, Chernobyl is one of the most vivid examples. Next, we will consider to what extent reflection and knowledge generate panic in public opinion. The sentiment of panic paralyzes the natural barriers to strategic risk management. Unless otherwise resolved, minor risk creates serious disasters by its cascade effects.
The Techonology of Science
A historiography of evolution of science merits deepening the question of technology. Although many historical waves of critics have discussed the issue, A. Cuevas distinguishes 3 important schools: a) the hierarchal model proposed by econometrics, b) non-hierarchal models proposed by sociology, c) a mixture of agent and system recently developed by the theorists of complexity (cybernetics). While each stage is characterized by focusing in diverse gravity technology exerts on human behaviour, the fact is that the connection between technology and science depends upon its application. Technology is based on two significant elements, artefacts and technique. Scientists employ the later to make the epistemology of science while the former ones are preferred to generate knowledge (Cuevas, 2005) . To expand the current understanding of the issue it is important to conduct interdisciplinary research. Every discipline developed a particular definition of the technology. It is important to remember that those groups whose access to the monopoly of technique has substantial advantage allows them to dominate others who are relegated to the currently prevailing technology. The problem is that technologies may be harmful whenever they do not support common well being. More often than not, imposition of new technologies risks a Huxleyan style dystopia.
S. Benko admits that technology is being accepted as a way of rationalizing the altering of conditions of existence for humankind. He argues that it may be used in gaining more knowledge but it should be accompanied by ethics, to make the lives easier, or to achieve some commonly shared goals. Therefore, social science should focus on the evolution of the ethic of technology in lieu of the technology of science (Benko, 2005) . The understanding of the possibilities or hazards of techno-revolution depends on the degree of ethics. In this vein, M. Scott Ruse replies that it is one thing to use technology in the accompaniment of human evolution, and quite another to confront the "hegemony of techno-humankind" that has accelerated after the advent of post modernity. The misuses of technology are determined by political goals, or social pathologies such as ambition, hunger and alienation. What is important to remember here is the connection between technology, risk, and mobility. Ruse argues that techno-revolution needs philosophical scrutiny because the nature of man is at stake. State, economy and the ontological perception of the world are penetrated in brain by means of technology. However, in the last centuries the global trends show a hegemony that transformed the technology into a totalitarian force. This process of alienation not only is counter-productive for societies but also virtualizes the space to become the human habitat in a great airconditioning system. Is technology culprit for ecological problems of earth?" Farris is not wrong when writes, the extension of technology into the infinite reaches of cyberspace is both exhilarating and wondrously productive in advancing the reach of intellectual and technical power. The accompanying dilemmas and ethical questions are bound to relate back to practical terms of our existence on planet Earth. Our interventions in the sphere of ecology are a critical test of our integrity. The simple action of sorting out the household garbage can remind us of the chain of being extending along our technological story. (Farris, 2005: 8) P. Virilio was one of the pioneers who anticipated a similarly-minded problem some years ago. In The University of Disaster he warns that the advances of technologies and mobilities not only have created new forms of displacements, but also have blurred the relation between time and space. As a result of this, people have full access to any geographical point of this globe in hours. The time of waiting has changed forever. Travelers now are moved by the indifference and visual consumption. There is not genuine contact in the visited lands. The events in the past formed history as a continuation of ordered facts, but global transportation and communication technologies make anew kind of real time in which people can no longer synchronize watches. Citizens have been transformed in consumers. History has been emptied into a fragmentation of events, dispersed globally and broadcast repeatedly. The attack on New York's World Trade towers in 2011 remains the iconic case in point (Virilio, 2010) .
Turning to the generation of knowledge, Virilio says that what had characterized the labor of University has been has been dispersed to delocalized territories. Based on an ongoing future that never makes room for the presentiment of disaster, knowledge announces the eschatology of neurosis. In other terms, Virilio argues that everything happens at the same time in the hyper-reality without a logical sequence. The world stage is represented outside the planet, in an exo-earth. The days of Science, as an all-encompassed instrument based on rational understanding, has changed. Transformed in an exo-science that promotes the simultaneous globalization of fear, whilst biology and astronomy are eclipsed by the "eternal present." Virilio emphasizes the "mea culpa" of science for its failure to create an ethic of life. Based on the belief that the global warming is not reversible in the short-run terms, science should explore issues from the perspective of homeland safety and security. To be protected, big corporations, banks, and the capitalist elite call climatologists and geographers (experts) to design catastrophe simulation software that provides some information about where the next disaster will take hit. In this vein, a new profession is rising, the "economic-disaster-modeling-geek." This expert seems to be more interested in finding and eliminating the risks to businesses, or finding ways to profit from such risks, than in protecting the environment. The philosophy of the science is today determined by the logic of digital screens. The simulation of future that characterizes the digital world has replaced the daily life (Virilio, 2010) .
Following this, Virilio recognizes that modern Science has become in an ally of the market -that is, science rationalizes neoliberalism. His main thesis may be exemplified in the following excerpt.
We might note a recent project whereby detection of major risks is reversed, since the computer in question is involved in producing said major risks. At the end of 2006, IBM effectively decided to build the most powerful super calculator in the world. To do so, it will use processors capable of up one million billon operations per second, accelerating by as much the reality of the disastrous progress in weapons of mass destructions… which prompts personal question: after having resorted to meteorologists and other climatologists to calculate the economic risk of catastrophe, will the insurance and reinsurance companies one day have to call on the army and their new strategists to detect major ecological risk of nuclear proliferation. (Virilio 2010: 18) In the past, geography remained immutable before disasters, impermeable to tragic issues. The advance of science moved at a snail´s pace by prioritizing the quality of knowledge. Its objectivity lies in the observation of facts rooted in reality. However, things have changed a lot. The digital world has blurred time, prompting science to study thousand of simultaneous events, which do not lead to any coherent logic. Reality is no longer the object of scientific research. Technology expanded the limits of cities towards the border of the planet. The contours are drawn with deep space situated as the only horizon that defines human habitat. Virilio insists on the belief that "the technical consciousness is what you put on the screen" (18). What is important to discuss here is not the "Techno-phobia," but "techno-philia" which prioritizes the measure of meaning. The growth of simulation software has been adapted in the domain of education, administration, and sports. Basically, these types of tools are meant to lead people to the most efficient decision to optimize their performances.
It is important to note that knowledge only may be understood in accordance with a specific time and space. Without places and present, information keeps circulating through the lens of televisions. The problem seems to be that the flow of information created by technology, which accompanied the transport in other times, is now the transport itself. Proponents of ecology, climatologists, geographers and other scientists concerned with global warming have no clue in what is going to happen, but they are recruited by insurance companies and corporations to design the next protection-related products in the market (Virilio, 2010) .
The bombing on Atocha´s station, is for Virilio, the most vivid example of how the era of synchronization set the pace to digital world. Undoubtedly, this terrorist attack would be a real tragedy except lack of synchronization led to the inability to coordinate the simultaneous arrival of all the trains. The delay not only saved many lives but also paved the ways for a new way of cultural entertainment, the acceleration of history, and the end of chronological time. But if disaster is fictionalized over and over again, there would be no way to inform in the face of a real threat. Another case in point: policy makers remain sceptical about the reality of global warming. Following this, Virilio says that science was a medieval project moved by the curiosity to study and watch the animals and environs. Today it can study is only a planet enroute to extinction.
Virilio gives a clear conceptual framework to understand the role played by the media, science and technology in the process of riskmanagement. Virilio warns that the problems are not risks but "the desert of the mind" inherited in "turbo-capitalism." If human beings do not change their values introducing the ethical, the problem of climate change will be aggravated with the passing of decades. Ironically, globalized capital is not willing to change its current ways of production and pollution. Rather, experts and universities are called by insurance corporations and banks to predict the effects of next disasters. As a result of this, applied research serves the interests of the market. Any attempt for mitigating the green-house effects are not aimed at fixing the problem of air pollution. While only the superfluous aspects of global warming are considered by the financial centre, the underlying values of globalized capital that generated the problem remains. The world is being transformed into a great air-conditioning system (Virilio, 2010) .
Technology, Knowledge and Reflexibility
Some sociologists focused on the role of experts that monopolize daily the use of such a technology. This was the case of Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman. While Bauman emphasized the hedonist consumption that leads modernity, Giddens puts the same problem in another way: the experts who frame and deal with risks. Unlike other times, today consumers are familiar with the product they buy but this point is secondary unless the fact that knowledge is suffering from a process of reflexibility. What characterizes social life in late-modernity seems to be the complexity of capitalism that re-structures the connection of institutions with their agents. From this view, the hegemony of scholars, that characterized life in Middle age, has set the pace to the advent of a reflexibility of education. This is the reason behind the problem of inflations in risk perception. Reflexivity obliges persons to find themselves beyond the influences of social institutions. Whether pre-modern societies saw in witchcraft a valid instrument to predict the future, the science of statistics not only validates the policies of the Nation-State regarding certain issues, but also represents reality for the society. Modern reflexibility has the capacity to create many realities depending on the purchasing power of consumers. With hindsight, Giddens goes on to say that, modernity's reflexivity refers to the susceptibility of most aspects of social activity, and material relation with nature, to chronic revision in the light of a new information or knowledge. Such a information or knowledge is not incidental to modern institutions, but constitutive of them … because many possibilities of reflection about reflexivity exist in modern social conditions. (Giddens, 1991: 20) In a recent book dedicated to ecology, Giddens acknowledges that the technology put at the disposal of humankind would make of the earth a better world, but this not only does not happen, but technology exerts pressure that deteriorate the conditions of life. While some risks are monitored and controlled, other, more globalized ones works as a runaway train (Giddens, 2011) . It is important to mention that, even if Giddens trivialized this point, accidents are based on randomness. Unless otherwise resolved, accidents would have been other things. To some extent, society may be compared with a complex system. Although capitalism has constructed a rational basis of control over almost all human interactions, the fact is that minor variables which have not been taken into account may collapse the whole system. This aporia opens the door towards a new thesis respecting technology. Contingency, uncertainty, and randomness are inextricably intertwined. C. Perrow says that the timing of actual accidents is based on the sad reality that a similar event could be repeated at least six times. We are daily facing serious, imperceptible risks that randomly do not materialize in an accident. The circles of control tend to be petrified so as not to monitor these minor risks, which sooner or later cause the disaster (Perrow, 1999) . The technical perspective not only ignores this reality but also thinks, erroneously, that risk may be controlled by technological machinery. Moreover, technology serves as well for making cyberterrorism, or to coordinate bloody riots. Some specialists agree that the uncontrollable riots in UK were organized by face book and other cybernets. This leads the state to exert censorship on the contents of what people write and read through the web. Undoubtedly, technology seems to be a double-edged sword. Technology plays a pervasive role because on one hand it may make life easier, domesticating people, but on another, serious bloody riots may be organized, or serious threats engendered. Surely, technology opens the doors to a paradox. Is democracy able to solve the problems of risks?
In his 2006 book Social Insecurity, Robert Castel examines how civil rights paved the way for the advent of a new way of conceiving of civility. Individual liberties were tied to private property. Based on the hegemony of capital, modern societies regarded safety as a mechanism to reduce the impacts of illness, poverty, disasters, and aging. If the medieval societies were subject to an unabated net of crises and dangers, modernity brought a certain well being. To some extent, this state of security that characterized technological advance in industrial times corresponds with an inflation of perceived risk. Paradoxically, far from being more secure, people live frightened by the news, or the scientific reports that discover causes of new cancers. By the same token, Castel sets forward an interesting thesis: the feeling of insecurity would be defined first and foremost as an obsession for protection. The advance of technology and science in human domain entailed new dangers in other times. This collective aversion corresponds with a lack of dependency among the different collectives that encompass society. Towns and cities were protected in medieval times by the symbolic hegemony of the Catholic Church, but afterwards liberty and modernity brought a certain autonomy of some agents with respect to others. Protection was given by the ethnicity and physical proximity. The vulnerability of citizenry, as today is known, comes with the decline of feuds and the industrial revolution. In preindustrial times, the degree of violence in daily life was one aspect of low life expectancy. With modernity, people experienced notable and prosperous changes in their well being, but social bonds were weakening as the decades passed. As a result of this, religion, which had provided protection to human being in past, has been replaced by the market (Castel, 2006) . What is important to remember here is that the economic growth from 1953 to 1970 introduced a notable rise in the level of consumption and production worldwide.
K. Erikson reminds us that disasters are not caused by technology without human intervention. His 1994 book, A New Species of Troubles, he describes the involvement of social factors as the key to human economic asymmetries that facilitate disaster. Capitalism and its injustices may be the worst disaster people may face. Risk derives from the lack of trust in others (uncertainty). The case of East Swallow, in Colorado, described in the third chapter, serves as a clear example of what has been stated. This town was alarmed in 1985 because a gas company found a spill which threatened the population. This spill did not generate any damages in the short term, but further along, effects on residents became increasingly dangerous. The intangibility of gas fumes in combination with the rise of continuous fears left residents of East Swallow in a full state of crisis (Erikson, 1994) .
The residents of East Swallow who were exposed to the effects of the gasoline spill complain -with considerable justice, one has to assume -that the value of their homes has declined precipitously as a result of recent events. In one sense, of course, that is a financial matter and outside the scope of this report: plaintiffs have invested large amount of capital into the dwelling they occupy, and they are understandably concerned about the safety of those investments. For many, maybe most of them, it is not just a matter of loosing a valuable possession; it is a matter of placing life's saving at risk. (Erikson, 1994: 116) The two factors that most concerned workers were: 1. A broader and exacerbated feeling of uncertainty about the health of family and relatives as well as the safety of their homes. These aspects represented one of the main reasons for psychological distress in the population. On the one hand, they dreaded leaving their own households because things could worsen during their absence. This means an explosion or a disaster of similar caliber. On the other hand, they were aware of the serious implication of not leaving the affected zone: a gradual and inevitable intoxication from the gas. 2. The second motive of distress was associated with the possibility of losing the place they invested so much money and effort in. This phenomenon seems to be well-described in the context of disasters. For example, in moments of crisis many evacuation procedures fail because the personnel come across residents who are reluctant to abandon their homes. The symbolic power of "home" in the construction of our identity is unquestionable, but in this case-study things seem to be a bit different. Certainly, spills of gas can turn into a more frightful hazard that affect a wide range of social activities and of course workers were in part responsible for those damages; sadness, desperation and panic were some of the feelings that Erikson noticed during his interviews.
One of the relevant aspects that terrified the whole population in this zone was the unpredictability of the next disaster. Metaphorically speaking, trapped between the devil and the blue sea, workers were in a terrifying situation. In addition, this terrible situation implicitly triggers new relations of support among neighbors. Affected persons looked to their community for the strength they were not able to find in their home. Erikson assumes that whereas home emotionally represents the place where the family lies; neighborhood plays a secondary role in the socialization process. Since home did not warrant any kind of ontological security, people deposited their trust in the neighborhood as a second option.
Similarly to Castel and Erikson, Ulrich Beck argues that in the past, disasters were seen as the result of human errors. After Chernobyl, Beck adds, the boundaries between classes and liabilities were blurred. Modern risks not only were developed in a globalized way but also jeopardized the stability of the whole system. These types of new risks installed the configuration of a new social order without recognition of classes or property. Information was the key factor to perceive and intellectualize a risk. As a result of this, logic of appropriation -which characterized classical mercantilism in past decades -is being replaced by its own antithesis, the logic of disavowal. It is not surprising that privileged groups hide collateral damages as a product of non-sustainable consumption. Their practices are supported thanks to the intervention of science and journalism. The underlying problem seems to be that duties and responsibilities are globalized at the same time humankind exhausts the non-renewable resources on earth as well as polluting the ozone layer. Beck fears superficiality whenever the risk is trivialized. The former is a result of the omission of the latter. After further examination, Beck explains that in "traditional society of classes" groups replicate certain criteria of social distinction according to the style of consumption. In the era of industrialism societies structured their solidarities based on property, blood relatedness and status.
Basically, Beck is concerned about the degradation of environment because of toxic wastes. Since this new kind of perceiving modernity obliges countries to combine efforts for solving daunting risks, the quality of community is being gradually transformed. In the passage from one to another type of society, concepts such as equality, wealth, and democracy are replaced by security, conflict, and fears. As noted above, Beck´s development seems comparable to Bauman's treatment of fear. For Bauman, in opposition to animals which feel basic fears determined by concrete dangers, human beings have the ability to elaborate secondary emotions characterized by being "socially and culturally" recycled. The problem of risk in Beck acquires a new nature; in Bauman's terms it is secondary fear (Beck, 2006) . Even though the modern states weave their legitimacy on basis of their abilities to give stability, protection, and security to citizenry, under some situations they subordinate these functions to the market. Nonetheless, it is not surprising to realize that risks are not emotions. The former are conditioned by uncertainty and probability, while the latter one follow tactics of adaptation. The temporal nature of life that marked the guidelines of medieval times has been replaced by the rejection of death. This means that today living is a more important time than dying. In a process that Bauman denominates deconstructionism of death, the West is experiencing a gradual panic about death. But this sentiment is not necessarily linked to death itself. Rather, this appeals to the fact of being abandoned, silenced, or forgotten. The visual imaginary today recognizes those who want to live forever.
The main thesis in Bauman is that rational allegation leads directly to the future, but in the future, risks are unreal; they are discourses or fictions functional to the consumption machinery. The fictionalized and visually consumed states of disasters not only open the doors for contingency but also for indoctrination. This was the example of Hurricane Katrina, which revealed two relevant aspects of racial discrimination. First and foremost, the majority of victims were blacks or Latin Americans living in situation of unpreparedness and poverty. These actors were excluded from the promise of Uncle Sam long ago. Secondly, the disaster took place in New Orleans many years before Katrina. This example helps readers to understand how modern disasters are screened by late-capitalism. It is hypothesized that modern bureaucracy not only affects the responsibility for actions in the different ways but also subordinates emotions into a secondary role. On the threshold of twentieth century, the ethical was replaced by instrumentality. Once the ability to consider how to use it rationally have deteriorated, advances of technology have the effect of reducing the costs of evasion (Bauman, 2008) . However, evasion is not liberty, and suspension of ethics contributes substantially to the fragmentation of common links. Risk applied to technology seems to be an slipperier matter. Some hints are given by A. Giddens and C. Susntein with respect to the modern aversion of risk associated with postmodernism.
Technology and Risk: Discussion between Giddens and Sunstein about the Role of Technology
From immemorial times, human beings have been subject to the will of nature. The advent of modernity changed forever the cosmology of societies with respect to the environment. The rise of temperature produced by industry and transport (green-house effect) has shifted the climate in a radical way that resulted in mega-hurricanes, droughts, or floods. These disasters not only shocked public opinion worldwide but also hit one of the most powerful nations, United States. After Katrina's episode, American public opinion was skeptical about the conditions and effects of global warming in our daily life. In this context, one question was whether global warming is a real hazard or a fake? In his book, the Politics of Climate Change, Giddens questions why most people, most of the time, act as though a threat of such a magnitude can be ignored?. Giddens argues that the problem of ecology becomes a paradox:
It states that, since the dangers posed by global warming aren´t tangible, immediate or visible in the course of day-to-day life, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature about them. Yet waiting until such dangers become visible and acute -in the shape of catastrophes that are irrefutably the result of climate change-before being stirred to serious action will be too late. (Giddens, 2011: 2) The problem of global warming concerns the nature of risk and its subjective nature. Now, while many people are afraid of flying in an airplane, they do not hesitate to smoke, or engage in any other high-risk behavior. The experts agree that human action is responsible for the situation while others dispute these claims. Given this argument, the decentralization process that accelerated the hierarchal order of society does not appear to be sufficient to prevent the negative aftermaths of climate change. Of course it is clear how people do not change, because others do not (tragedy of commons). Giddens argues that the government should tackle the problem by intervening directly in the current levels of green-house emissions. This requires an international coordination as the only alternative to cope with natural catastrophes (Giddens, 2011) .
Unfortunately, the author advises "time is running out." His assumptions about the market, lead us to consider that trade and market can be part of the solution. The market, controlled and guided by the state may play a pivotal role in reducing the greenhouse effects in coming years. The question of climate change is associated with problems in energy security.
The energy needs of the industrial countries have created most of the emissions that are causing global warming. The rapid economic growth of developing nations, especially in China and India, given their immense population size, is putting further strain on available energy sources, as well as increasing the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. (Giddens, 2011: 7) The volume of gases to atmosphere is growing year to year, which requires an immediate change in the kind of energy used. As a form of risk, climate change opens the doors for a new opportunity as well. In the first chapter, Giddens recognizes the influence of Fourier who was the pioneer in discovering how the energy forms can affect the climate. After a careful review of the numbers about the rise of temperature, Giddens says that probabilities of sea levels increase, as well as population control, will cause serious and severe natural disasters. The topography of earth will change and with this, some scholars state that humankind will face serious resource-related wars and ecological massmigration. Of course, there is a minority who are more skeptical about the effects of global warming. For these scholars, cited by Giddens, the climate is experiencing a moderate alteration which is not being provoked by human action. Geology has warned about the probabilities that each 1500 years the sun-spot variation can subtly affect the climate in the planet. This does not mean any radical alteration for us, and even in a negative scenario, the life as we know will surely continue. Sociologically speaking, in the time of extreme frights and apocalypse, global warming seems to be only one of many. Quite aside from this, Giddens recognizes the global warming wakes up controversy, and criticism would play a pivotal role to define and understand the problem (Giddens, 2011) .
Following this reasoning, the IPCC procedures and conclusions are not only weak but also lack of scientific basis: Skepticism, to repeat, is essential to the scientific method, and there are some skeptics who are prepared to submit their work and their claims to the same rigorous process of examination by critics that they (rightly) demand of the mainstream scientific community. The trouble is that the majority are not, setting up a double clear standard. Attacks on science, or individual scientists, cannot only become quite vicious, but proceed in quite another dimension from that of science as such. (Giddens, 2011: 25) Among the tactics by the media to dissuade public opinion from the coming disaster are: a) present pseudo-experts who are scientists, but lack credentials in the field they are handling; b) give a sense of division whenever there is basic agreement by exercising censorship against one of the two sides; and c) pick and show evidence selectively to create an argument about the event. Rather, the radical voices suggest humankind is in danger if substantial policies are not followed. A safe level of atmospheric carbon dioxide is 350 ppm, and now the level is higher than this limit, Giddens adds. What way must we make of this problem?. Giddens acknowledges that radicals agree the climate is being changed while skeptics, many of whom are not climate scientists, do not publish their views in peer-reviewed journals. Giddens overtly states "I am not a scientist. It is up to the scientific community to assess the ideas of the radicals and deceide how much weight to attach to them" (Giddens, 2011: 31) .
The philosophy of this work exemplifies how the problem of global warming is not necessarily just intertwined with the effects of carbon, but to the dependency of industrialized nations on oil. After the war between Arab league and Israel in the 1970s, the developed countries experienced a new situation in the ways of producing energy. This event led certain European and Latin-American countries to make up different strategies to replace the oil with other local forms of energies. The United States was obliged to intervene Middle East, first and foremost in support of Saudi Arabia in its quest for oil and gas. The American interest in Middle East not only engendered some long-simmering conflicts but also posed serious problems in their oil and gas reserves. What is most important in this case, does not seem to be the effects of global warming, which Giddens accepts are in controversy, but the social problems involved in the war for resources that oil creates.
Taking his cue from C. Susstein's works, Giddens explains convincingly that there are two types of definitions regarding these ecological problems that range from weak to strong. The former refers to the need of regulation aside from the existence of a real damage, while the latter one is that any action should be taken only if hard evidence of the risk exists. Although the strong definition leads scholars to a "truism," because in the paranoia for mitigating other risks they create new risks, but the weak type makes society additionally vulnerable. With considerable criticism against the precautionary principle, this chapter reveals the pervasive nature of risks. It suggests, for example, preventive measures to mitigate the aftermath of global warming can create other unsought risks. In addition, in the same chapter, the pervasiveness of sustainability and development are examined in depth. What seems to be important here is not to lose sight pf the fact that sustainability entails continuity, but development is preferably linked to progress. Of course, the first environmentalists not only heard these differences but also mingled both in a similarly-minded sense. Trust in technologies and human intervention, linked to development, contrasts sharply with conservation. To dilute this quandary, sustainability was re-defined on the basis of five components: a) the condition of the ecological system, b) these system are circumscribed by level of pollution, c) pollution impacts negatively in human communities, d) the needs of evaluating society's capacity to face environmental hazards, and e) the capacity to give "global public goods" to improve the quality of life. Once again, development from this moment onwards was strictly considered an efficient way to enhance the necessary economic growth to revitalize the local resources of communities. A global policy of this caliber nourished a discourse in poor developing countries, and of course started a process which was self-perpetuating. Nowadays, the political negotiations seem to witness a paradox: rich countries aim at reducing emissions of gases while poor countries put their efforts in reaching the promises of development. Of course, the rich countries' businesses profit from poor countries development, and that is what really sets the agenda for political debate. To what extent technology may liberate humankind from risk or aggravates the problem seems to be an open question (Giddens, 1991; 2011) .
In sharp contrast with Giddens, C. Sunstein develops a new conceptual framework to understand the inflation of risk and the inability of the state to reverse the situation.His is a primitive neoliberal aopproach that vests everything in the market. Of course, the work of this American lawyer has certainly seen different influences from the sociologist, Giddens. His efforts to understand modern risk are better explained after reading Risk & Reason, where the logic of risk is placed under the lens of rational scrutiny. Considering Sunstein in opposition to Giddens may be a clear mistake. Instead, both provide complementary development to connect the problem of risk with the state and the empire of law. To return to the questions in the introductory section, Sunstein describes the sniper in Washington DC who randomly killed more than 10 passers bye in 2002. Under some circumstances, the sentiment of widespread fear in society can generate major undesirable effects. Generally, the events and news our eye captures are spectacularly exaggerated by our own emotions or fabricated by mass-media. Ranging from terrorism to strange lethal flu, public opinion often misjudges the correct probabilities for apocalyptic disasters. However, less attention is given to other more important aspects that kill thousands of citizens annually such as traffic accidents, strokes, and protein-poor diets. This seems exactly to be the primary issue of study in Sunstein´s project (Sunstein, 2002) .
Sunstein realizes that there are two social mechanisms that magnify risk perception: a) the availability of a heuristic and b) probability neglect. The former refers to the mental disposition for reminding us about the similarity of events with lower probabilities of realization. When this happens, the social imaginary overestimates the danger by broadcasting a state of alarmism to the rest of society. These irrational behaviors lead people to a sentient of panic that prevents a rational orchestration of policies. The latter probability neglect, which is enabled when citizens, more sensible to the effects of disasters, neglect the probabilities. Of course, the combination of both mechanisms not only may create a generalized state of despair, but also groundless fears are often captured, processed, and re-channeled by some economic actors following the interests of the status quo. If the citizenry asks for more security, the state will undoubtedly fall into a quandary. On one hand, the state will employ populist discourses to reduce the dissonance of security in the mind of citizens, but these policies will be inefficient, aggravating the problem and generating new risks, likely more dangerous ones. In an experiment reported by Sunstein (2002) precisely demonstrates how lay people and even experts make daily decisions that virtually lead to extreme and irreversible states of emergencies. Decision making processes seem not to be controlled by a rational, all-encompassing view. For example, in 2002 Hatfield City (in England) was witness to a shocking rail accident with many victims and causalities. To reduce the sentiment of fear, people opted to take bus and other motor vehicles to replace trains, but this generated more serious accidents and crashes. This aspect shows how important it is for government to find the real causes of disasters and work to correct them. States, in view of this evidence, should ignore the irrational citizen's demand. It is important that the state legislates to intervene only in particular cases. Technology is conducive to collate the necessary dataset, information and knowledge to make correct decisions. Risk is not a result of technology advance, precisely the opposite; risk is a product of human ignorance (Sunstein, 2002) .
Sunstein examines the paradox of risk and complexity whenever the state echoes automatically the claims of its citizenry. Sunstein clarifies an approach to cost/benefit method that allows experts and officials to determine what are the risks that should be focused on and under what conditions the state should intervene. This assumption is based on an old belief that social agents behave following the irrational dictate of feelings. As a result of this, people often think taking the short cut to facilitate their previous assumptions, but thereby generate new risks. His valuable text is structured into ten chapters where the author deals with the problem of global warming and ecology. From many perspectives, he aspires to set forth a new model to help practitioners and policy-makers on disaster issues to make the correct decisions. If the law is strong, the state and jurisprudence should follow only those claims that represent more benefits than costs. A clear and deep evaluation of cost and benefits is more than important for an efficient administration. Of course, much criticism has been widely leveled against this book. To a greater or lesser degree, Sunstein acknowledges that the magnitude of costs sometimes is not clearly defined or is at least very hard to see. Secondly, this model trivializes the role of social patrimony and can be misunderstood as an effort to install a new dictatorship based on expertise and rational knowledge. To these critiques, Sunstein argues that state should protect its citizens by making good decisions and evaluating with rational instruments the alternatives. To overcome the current climate of populism that characterizes the modern world is one of the challenges any state should face. To be honest, Sunstein's work has two significant limitations which will be reconsidered but presents as an excellent academic research, based on years of experience (Sunstein, 2002) . What is important to highlight in this discussion is that in the cybernetic complex system, any act does not correspond with clear effect. Some plans duly scrutinized by experts may be backfired.
Future Research Directions
Sunstein's approach is persistently aimed at exploring two aspects of risk, perception and its effects while focusing on the role played by trust abridging alternatives to forecast those potential risks. A correct evaluation of risks allows experts and officials to make correct decisions to deter a catastrophe. As already noted, his stance is developed with two errors. At a first glance, Sunstein tries to describe a problem from a onesided gaze. Risk, calculation, and democracy are social constructions that facilitated the expansion of capitalism. The cost/benefit model will generate more risks than supposed because it ignores the real nature of risk. Basically, risk is not a result of citizen's ignorance, but a gradual process that allowed the replication of capital. Secondly, the United States and its deliberative functions should not be considered as a democracy, because in many senses the form of its organization is not an enough to permit democratic life. If in ancient Greece democracy allowed citizens to reject an arbitrary law, in modern society this faculty is impossible. The concept of democracy is strictly applied to the autonomy between powers and popular voting. Furthermore, Anglodemocracy, historically speaking, resulted from two important social forces: mass consumption and freedom. The medieval institution of charity was a serious obstacle for industrialism. This last movement encouraged a scripted sentiment of liberty so the citizenry can sell its productivity across long distances if necessary. The old Catholic institution of charity that protected people set the pace for paid work. As a result of this, social bonds started to experience a gradual fragmentation. This restructuration was accelerated by the combination of other secondary factors such as industrialization, mobility, the dissociation between time and space, and democracy. To some extent, money worked as a mediator connecting people that had nothing in common or lacked of previous familiarity. With the introduction of risk in modern life, the insurance corporations, originally created to absorb risks, employed the interest rate to increase the volume of capital. The dangers travelers would face to carry goods from one to another point of the globe (from eigteenth century onwards) determines the final transaction price. Under this viewpoint, risk was functional to the expansion of mercantilism and later capitalism. Besides, each society develops particular forms of living democracy according to a sentiment of autonomy that alternates between efficiency and institutionalism. For example, Latin American societies have constructed a shared meaning of democracy prioritizing particular questions of personal well being rather than the autonomy of the individual as in England or United States. What is noteworthy to mention here is that democracies in these countries are circumscribed by a high degree of political conflict and instability while the Anglo world has more stable forms of organizations based on the hegemony of few corporations. This does not mean one type is preferable or better than others, or that United State is the only democracy that other countries should aspire to emulate. Unfortunately, Sunstein is unable to break with a widespread sentiment of Democracycentrism.
Last but not least, anthropology revealed long ago, the function of taboos was to protect some parts of local economies. Like risk, taboo works as an economic mechanism that facilitates trade in one direction while banning the commercialization of some goods in another. Risk, thus, operates by the introduction of a discourse, mediated and disseminated by religion, journalism and experts, where some practices or goods are strictly prohibited. Comparatively, risk confers on some groups the monopoly of using certain goods to gain more legitimacy or to dissuade others. While some properties may be widely exchanged depreciating their value, others are banned but strongly requested. The value of the latter goods is so exorbitant that they become inalienable possessions. Furthermore, those actors that monopolize the possession of these taboo-goods enhance their prestige and gain further legitimacy than others. This generates an economic asymmetry between the citizens. To set a clear example, terrorism was defined as the main risk for America and West for the XXIth century. As a social construction, the narrative of terrorism facilitates certain goods to be consumed and reserves others. The rates of insurances for airplanes have risen from 9/11 onwards whereas the gun trade has proliferated on US soil. Another example: as a result of aristocracy's pressure, the demand for sacred-taboo goods slumps down. At the same time, these privileged groups reserve for themselves the usage and application of the taboo-goods to their discretion. To put this bluntly, risk cuts social interaction in one point and allows a redirection in the opposite direction to discipline the citizenry. From this perspective, risk not only appears to be functional to the existent economy but also for the reduction of legal ambiguities. What Sunstein and Giddens ignore is that the proliferation of risk cannot be mitigated by means of calculation, rationally or democracy simply because they are part of the problem, not the solution.
Conclusion
Through this chapter, we discussed in depth the more relevant studies respecting the connection between risk and technology, as well as reviewed the most interesting points in how risk may be mitigated or generated. The advance of technology by itself is not enough to mitigate all risks. As never before, today global warming poses serious challenges not only for industrial societies but for the life in the planet all. To what extent new forms of energy and combustions will help to control the negative effects of greenhouse effects seems to be uncertain. Given this, detractors of technology suggest the abandonment of the existing forms of production in order to bring back a pristine style of life. This would solve the problem of global warming to some extent, but at the bottom generates other problems. As Sunstein put it, thousands of millions of families will suffer serious economics losses if Western countries abruptly change the sources of production. Sooner or later, Giddens replies, the sources of oil will be exhausted and we will face serious problems in our economies. For that, we are obliged to change the source of energy of our technological devices to optimize and reduce the negative risks pollution creates. Unless otherwise resolved, Giddens and Sunstein deposited their trust in the role of democracy to control not only the avarice of capitalists but also the risks resulting from technological intervention. Rather, we think technology is only an instrument that may be employed for the good or the evil depending upon the political interests. What is important to discuss here, is not the role of technology in the existent forms of productions, but also the ethics of market which monopolized all human relations to the hunger of modern citizens that never may be satiated. The fetish of consumption installed the idea that happiness only may be reached by rationality. If I make some steps to achieve a goal, this is the correct direction. This view trivialized the role of emotions and deeper psychological drives of consumers. The needs for more, inevitably, demanded external recognition but these needs are ephemeral and never may be satisfied. Since this emptiness never can be fulfilled, modern consumers deposit their expectations in new products and new technology. This creates a vicious circle that leads directly to solipsism. The intervention of states to mitigate some risks creates others but as explained, there dangers are not resulted from the advance of technology but by the decline of trust. Potential research should pay attention to these remarks in a near future.
